Abstract-In this paper, we investigate the secrecy performance for a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel in the presence of a multiantenna eavesdropper. In particular, the legitimate transmitter uses transmit antenna selection (TAS) to transmit on a single antenna with the largest signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) while both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper adopt maximal ratio combining (MRC) for reception. We derive exact closed-form expressions for the probabilities of achieving positive secrecy rate and secrecy outage in the case of imperfect feedback due to feedback delay and/or feedback error. Furthermore, we derive the asymptotic secrecy outage probability at high SNR, which accurately reveals the secrecy diversity loss due to imperfect feedback. Simulation results are provided to verify our analytical results and illustrate the impact of imperfect feedback on the secrecy performance of such a wiretap system.
systems, the limitation that the main channel (between the transmitter and the receiver) could be worse than the eavesdropper channel (between the transmitter and the eavesdropper) can be overcome. In particular, the achievable secrecy rate in the Gaussian multiple-input single-output (MISO) wiretap channel was studied in [4] and [5] , which demonstrated that the optimal communication strategy was beamforming (i.e., the rank of the input covariance matrix was one). Following further efforts, the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel has been fully characterized in [6] [7] [8] .
Achieving the secrecy capacity would require the transmitter to have precise knowledge of the eavesdropper channel [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] , which in many cases is infeasible. In this respect, artificial noise (AN) assisted beamforming, or masked beamforming, becomes a practical method of providing secure communications without the knowledge of the eavesdropper channel [9] . In masked beamforming, the transmitter allocates a fraction of its power to confuse the eavesdropper in addition to transmitting the information-bearing signal [10] . However, imprecise knowledge of the main channel will cause interference leakage to the legitimate receiver when AN is used. To address this, a robust beamforming scheme was proposed in [11] to minimize the transmit power for guaranteeing a preset signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) for the legitimate receiver. In addition, instead of full channel state information (CSI) of the main channel known to the transmitter, [12] analyzed the secrecy performance of codebook beamforming transmission in the case of limited CSI feedback.
Although these beamforming or precoding schemes in [9] [10] [11] [12] lessen the requirement of the knowledge of the eavesdropper channel, the problem of requiring the entire or partial CSI of the main channel at the transmitter (e.g., full CSI for masked beamforming [9] , [10] and the channel estimate for robust beamforming [11] ) remains, which incurs high feedback overhead from the legitimate receiver to the transmitter. On the other hand, the front-end architecture and radio frequency (RF) section of multi-antenna nodes are highly complex and expensive. One effective remedy is to use transmit antenna selection (TAS) and/or maximal-ratio combining (MRC) reception, which offers a good trade-off between complexity and performance [13] . The TAS scheme requires only a single RF chain, resulting in considerable reduction in cost, complexity and size. Furthermore, only log N t bits are necessary to be fed back from the legitimate receiver to the transmitter.
Without secrecy, the advantage of spatial diversity for TAS-MRC schemes has been well understood in [14] [15] [16] , where the receiver selects the transmit antenna according to a certain criterion (e.g., maximizing the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)), and the optimal antenna index is then fed back to the transmitter. In practice, the feedback may be outdated and/or in error. The effects of time-delayed feedback on TAS-MRC schemes were investigated in [14] and [15] . The results were recently extended to Nakagami-m fading channels in [16] and closed-form symbol error rate (SER) expressions were derived.
In recent years, there has also been great interest on TAS-MRC for secure communications in the presence of a single-or multi-antenna eavesdropper [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] . In [17] , the secrecy outage probability for MRC and selection combining (SC) at the eavesdropper was compared. It was revealed that SC at one multi-antenna eavesdropper will have the same effect as that at multiple non-colluding single-antenna eavesdroppers. Moreover, He et al. [18] considered MRC at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, and derived closed-form expressions for the probability of non-zero secrecy rate and the secrecy outage probability. The impact of correlation for a single-input multiple-output (SIMO) system using MRC was analyzed in [19] . Results illustrate that antenna correlation at the receiver will severely degrade the secrecy performance, especially in the low average channel gain regime. In addition, the secrecy performance for MIMO wiretap channels with orthogonal space-time block codes (OSTBCs) and arbitrary antenna correlation was also analyzed in [20] . In [21] and [22] , TAS was considered to improve the secrecy performance over Rayleigh and Nakagami-m fading channels, respectively. Both MRC and SC at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper were studied in [22] . The derived asymptotic secrecy outage probability indicated that the secrecy diversity order was the same as that without secrecy and independent of the number of the eavesdropper's antennas. Then, Yang et al. [23] examined the impact of antenna correlation for MIMO wiretap channels in which the transmitter used TAS while both the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper used MRC. More recently, Yang et al. [24] proposed the TAS at the transmitter and the generalized SC (GSC) at the receiver to enhance secure communications.
The operation of TAS requires feedback from the receiver to the transmitter but the limitation of the analysis in [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] is that such feedback is assumed delay-and error-free; as such, the transmitter can always select the optimal antenna. However, perfect feedback is impossible in practical systems, and the feedback is usually imperfect [14] [15] [16] . In this paper, we study the impact of imperfect feedback on the secrecy performance for the MIMO wiretap channel in the presence of a multi-antenna eavesdropper, in which, similar to [23] , the transmitter selects a single antenna to maximize the SNR at the receiver, and both the receiver and the eavesdropper employ MRC. Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• Without secrecy, the SER for the TAS-MRC scheme with imperfect feedback has been well studied in [16] .
The effect of outdated CSI on the secrecy outage probability for a MISO wiretap channel in the presence of a single-antenna eavesdropper with TAS was investigated recently in [25] , in which the exact and asymptotic expressions for secrecy outage probability were derived. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, the effect of imperfect feedback on the secrecy performance for the TAS-MRC scheme in a general MIMO wiretap channel has not been addressed in the literature. Following the similar line of [16] , our work in this paper fills this gap.
• We derive new closed-form expressions for the probability of non-zero secrecy rate and the secrecy outage probability when separately and jointly considering feedback delay and feedback errors. Our results encompass existing results with perfect feedback as special cases.
• Further, we provide asymptotic analysis for the secrecy outage probability at high SNRs for the main channel.
It is illustrated that with perfect feedback, TAS-MRC can achieve the same secrecy diversity order as that in the non-security setting, i.e., N t N r , where N t and N r denote the numbers of transmit antennas and receive antennas, respectively. However, when the feedback is outdated and/or in error, the diversity gain from TAS will disappear and only the MRC diversity at the receiver side can be realized, i.e., the secrecy diversity order becomes N r . Interestingly, it can be found that the secrecy diversity order is independent of the number of the eavesdropper's antennas N e , which only affects the secrecy array gain. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model of the TAS-MRC MIMO wiretap channel. In Section III, we study the effect of time-delayed feedback while Section IV investigates the secrecy performance with erroneous feedback. We characterize the secrecy performance when both feedback delays and feedback errors are present in Section V. Simulation results are presented in Section VI, and we conclude the paper in Section VII.
Notations-Upper case and lower case bold letters denote matrices and column vectors, respectively. E{·} denotes statistical expectation while Pr{·} denotes the probability of an input event. Also, a returns the Frobenious norm of vector a. We use I N to denote an N × N identity matrix. The set of all N-dimensional complex vectors is denoted by C N , and x ∼ CN (0, σ 2 I N ) means that x is a random vector following a complex circular Gaussian distribution with zero mean and covariance σ 2 I N . x denotes the closest integer not less than x and all logarithms are base-2 unless otherwise indicated.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES

A. System Model
As shown in Fig. 1 , we consider a MIMO wiretap channel with an N t -antenna transmitter (named Alice), an N r -antenna intended receiver (Bob), and also an N e -antenna eavesdropper (Eve). Denote the main channel and the eavesdropper channel, respectively, by H ∈ C N r ×N t , and G ∈ C N e ×N t , whose entries are independent and identically We assume that the eavesdropper channel is not available to both Alice and Bob, i.e., a passive eavesdropper. The overall TAS-MRC scheme is carried out in two phases [25] .
• TAS Phase: Since Alice has only a single RF chain, it has to send the pilot sequence one by one for the channel estimation at Bob. We assume that Bob can perfectly estimate the CSI corresponding to each transmit antenna. After that, Bob selects a transmit antenna associated with the best instantaneous SNR, and feeds back the optimal antenna index to Alice. The feedback information can be represented by a binary vector with B = log N t bits.
• Transmission Phase: During the information transmission, the CSI corresponding to the optimal antenna should be estimated again for decoding at Bob. Using the pilot tones in the data frame, Bob can obtain the accurate CSI of the main channel and subsequently feed back the instantaneous SNR of the main channel to Alice for wiretap code construction. 1 As the eavesdropper channel is unavailable, the TAS criterion used is to select the highest post-processing SNR for Bob, which is entirely determined by the CSI of the main channel. As such, the index of the selected antenna, u * , is given by
where h (u) corresponds to the uth column of H. Nevertheless, from Eve's point of view, the optimum TAS scheme for Bob will be a random TAS, as the main channel and the eavesdropper channel are uncorrelated. Consequently, the TAS scheme will provide the diversity gain to Bob but not to Eve; secure communications can thus be realized.
Alice encodes each message w into a codeword x = [x(1), x(2), . . . , x(n)], where n is the length of x, and the transmitted codeword is subject to an average power constraint
The received signals at Bob and Eve at time i are, respectively, written as
1 Unlike the conventional TAS-MRC scheme without secrecy consideration, Bob has to feed back the received SNR value to Alice for wiretap code construction, in addition to the optimal transmit antenna index.
where h denotes the N r ×1 vector for the main channel h(u * ), and g denotes the N e × 1 vector for the eavesdropper channel between the u * th transmit antenna at Alice and Eve, i.e., g g(u * ). Also, n b and n e are additive white complex Gaussian noise at Bob and Eve, respectively. We assume that n b ∼ CN (0, σ 2 b I N r ), and n e ∼ CN (0, σ 2 e I N e ). We consider the MRC reception scheme to be employed at both Bob and Eve since MRC always outperforms other diversity combining schemes [26] . 2 As a result, the instantaneous SNRs of the main channel and the eavesdropper channel can be, respectively, given by
The achievable secrecy rate R s can be expressed as [27] 
where R m log (1 + γ m ) and R w log (1 + γ w ) are the achievable instantaneous rates at Bob and Eve, respectively.
B. Preliminaries
The secrecy performance of TAS/MRC-based PLS scheme for MIMO wiretap channels with perfect feedback has been studied in the literature [22] . With perfect feedback, it is well known that the probability density function (pdf) of the SNR for the main channel γ m , denoted by f (γ m ), follows the ordered χ 2 distribution, given by [16] 
where
is the average SNR per receive antenna. In addition, when TAS is not employed at the transmitter (i.e., N t = 1), the pdf and cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the SNR at the MRC combiner output, denoted p (γ ) and P (γ ), respectively, are reduced to [15] ⎧
2 SC employed at the eavesdropper was also considered in [22] . In this case, the TAS-MRC scheme has a better secrecy performance than that of MRC scheme at the eavesdropper. However, in this paper, to highlight the impact of imperfect feedback on the secrecy performance, we assume that the eavesdropper has a higher computational capability, i.e., MRC scheme is adopted at the eavesdropper. The secrecy performance analysis for the SC reception scheme at the eavesdropper can be conducted in a similar manner.
where (a, x) = x 0 t a−1 e −t dt denotes the lower incomplete Gamma function.
Using (8) , the pdf of γ w , denoted by f (γ w ), is [21] f (γ w ) = γ
denotes the average SNR per receive antenna for the eavesdropper channel.
In this TAS-MRC scheme, due to the absence of the Eve's channel knowledge, Alice will transmit at an arbitrary rate R 0 . For passive eavesdroppers, the wiretap code construction at Alice is based on the main channel capacity R m and R 0 . The estimate of the eavesdropper's channel capacity is assumed asR w = R m − R 0 [17] , [24] . Therefore, if R 0 < R s , or the eavesdropper's channel is worse than Alice's estimate, i.e., R w <R w , perfect secrecy can thus be obtained. Otherwise, if R 0 > R s , then R w >R w and such transmission may not be secure, leading to secrecy outage. Here, we consider the scenario in which the feedback of the optimal transmit antenna index is outdated and/or erroneous, and as a consequence, the transmitter may not select the optimal antenna. In the subsequent sections, we will find new closedform expressions for the probability of non-zero secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability when separately and jointly considering time-delayed feedback and erroneous feedback. Based on those exact expressions, asymptotic analysis is carried out, which completely characterizes the impact of imperfect feedback on the secrecy performance.
III. PERFORMANCE WITH TIME-DELAYED FEEDBACK
In practical systems, the TAS phase may exceed the coherent time of the channel. As a result, the main channel may have already changed the moment when Alice receives the feedback of the optimal antenna index because of the time-varying nature of the wireless channel. In this case, the optimal antenna is selected based on outdated CSI. Let h(n − τ ) denote the τ time-delayed main channel version of the current CSI h(n). We adopt the Gauss-Markov fading model to characterize the relationship between h(n − τ ) and h(n) [28] , i.e.,
where e(n) ∼ CN (0, I N r ) is the channel error vector, which is independent of h(n − τ ), and √ ρ is the correlation coefficient between h(n) and h(n − τ ), which is given by
, where J 0 (·) is the zeroth-order Bessel function of the first kind, and f d denotes the Doppler frequency.
Furthermore, let γ m denote the time-delayed version of the current SNRγ m , i.e.,γ m = h(n) 2 
Note that the pdf ofγ m , denoted by f (γ m ), can be expressed as [16] , [25] 
where p (γ m |γ m ) denotes the pdf ofγ m conditioned on γ m , and γ m and γ m are two correlated χ 2 -distributed random variables.
According to [29] , the conditional pdf is given by
where I v (·) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind with the order of v, and the correlation coefficient ρ is given (12) into (11), we can obtain the pdf ofγ m as
When ρ = 1, it corresponds to the case τ = 0, i.e., perfect feedback without delay and that (13) boils down to (7) .
In addition, an important issue is the construction of wiretap code in the case of time-delayed feedback. To construct the corresponding wiretap code, Bob has to feed back the current SNR valueγ m to Alice during the transmission phase. We assume that the feedback ofγ m is perfect. Thus, Alice will use the main channel capacity of R m = log(1 +γ m ) to construct the wiretap code and transmit the signal at the antenna selected based on h(n − τ ) [25] . Next, we will characterize the impact of the nonoptimal antenna selection caused by time-delayed feedback on the secrecy performance.
A. Secrecy Outage Probability
For a given target secrecy rate R 0 > 0, the secrecy outage probability is formulated as [27] 
The meaning of (14) is twofold. First, it includes the outage probability for the case where Alice does not transmit, i.e., R m ≤ R 0 . It also gives the metric for the case where the message transmission is not perfectly secure, i.e., there exists some information leakage to Eve [17] , [27] .
With some tedious mathematical manipulations, we can calculate the inner integral P 1 as (15) , as shown at the top of the next page, whereγ w = 2 R 0 γ w + 2 R 0 − 1 . Furthermore, replacing the value of f (γ w ) and P 1 , we obtain the closedform expression of (14) as (16), as shown at the top of the next page, where η =
Note that when ρ = 1, it corresponds to the case of perfect feedback and the secrecy outage probability in (16) is reduced to (17) , as shown at the top of this page, with η = i+1 γ m . On the other hand, if ρ = 0, the current channel will be fully independent of the channel the moment Bob selects transmit antenna, and Alice will select an arbitrary antenna to transmit data. In this case, the secrecy outage probability of the random TAS scheme is given by (18) , as shown at the top of this page.
Remark 1: In the case of single transmit antenna, i.e., N t = 1, we can obtain the corresponding secrecy outage probability by using (17) , which corresponds to [18, (6) ], i.e., MRC with perfect feedback. Furthermore, it can be found that the secrecy outage probability of N t = 1 is the same as that of the random TAS scheme, which infers that when the feedback is significantly outdated (i.e., ρ = 0), the diversity gain from the TAS disappears, and only the MRC diversity at Bob remains.
Remark 2:
In the case of single receive antenna, i.e., N r = 1, the secrecy outage probability can be derived from (17) as
which aligns with [21, (9) ]. For the special case of single antenna at all nodes, i.e., N t = N r = N e = 1, (18) and (19) reduce to
, [27] .
B. The probability of Non-Zero Secrecy Rate
According to (6) , the probability of non-zero secrecy rate can be expressed as
Letting R 0 = 0 in (15), we havẽ
Note that ρ = 1 corresponds to the case of perfect feedback. In this case, the probability of non-zero secrecy rate in (21) reduces to
where μ =γ m + (i + 1)γ w . In addition, if ρ = 0 in (21), the probability of non-zero secrecy rate of the random TAS scheme can be expressed as
Remark 3: In the case of single transmit antenna, i.e., N t = 1, the corresponding probability of non-zero secrecy rate can be obtained from (22) . This concurs with the result in [18, (3) ], i.e., MRC with perfect feedback. Moreover, it can be observed that the probability of non-zero secrecy rate of N t = 1 is equal to that of the random TAS in (23) , which means that when ρ = 0, the random TAS scheme cannot obtain any secrecy performance gain. In other words, when the feedback of the optimal antenna index is severely outdated (i.e., ρ = 0), the gain from TAS vanishes.
C. Asymptotic Outage Probability
In the high SNR regime withγ m → ∞, the asymptotic secrecy outage probabilityε ∞ out can be expressed as
where o(·) denotes higher order terms. The asymptotic secrecy outage probability gives valuable insights via the secrecy diversity order d, which determines the slope of the outage probability curve, and the secrecy array gain , which characterizes the SNR gain relative to the reference curveγ −d m [22] . Next, we derive asymptotic expressions for the cases ρ = 1 and ρ = 1 to reveal the diversity loss due to outdated feedback and how the secrecy outage probability behaves at high SNR.
• ρ = 1: We first expand the exponential function in (13) using the Taylor series expansion given by e −x = ∞ k=0 (−x) k /k!. Then, we only keep the first two terms and obtain the cdf ofγ m as
By plugging (25) into (14), the asymptotic expression for the secrecy outage probability can be rewritten as (27) • ρ = 1: Similarly, we obtain the first non-zero order expansion of the cdf of γ m from (7) as
Thus, in this case, the asymptotic secrecy outage probability can be obtained as
From above, we can observe that with perfect feedback, the TAS-MRC scheme can obtain the secrecy diversity order of N t N r . However, when the feedback is outdated, the desired diversity order cannot be realized and only the MRC diversity gain remains. The secrecy diversity order is independent of N e , which only affects the secrecy array gain . In addition, using the inequality
e , it can also be inferred that the secrecy array gain 1 and 2 are the monotonously increasing functions of N e . Moreover, we assume that the total number of transmit antenna and receive antenna is fixed, i.e., N t + N r = N total . Thus, an intuitive idea is to allocate the best number of antennas to Alice and Bob for minimizing the secrecy outage probability. When ρ = 1, we should allocate more antennas to Bob, i.e., N t = 1, N r = N total − 1. However, when ρ = 1, a lower bound on the asymptotic secrecy outage probabilityε ∞ out can be given byε
. We observe that the first term of the lower bound 1 (N r !) N t stands in a dominant position at high SNR. Hence, we can minimize the function
α N total to approximately determine the best asymptotic allocation, where α = N t /N total . Unfortunately, it is a non-linear function of α and the best value is dependent on N total . We will carry out numerical simulations to characterize this analysis in Section VI.
IV. PERFORMANCE WITH ERRONEOUS FEEDBACK
In this section, we consider the case that the feedback of the optimal antenna index is not outdated, but may be received in error due to an unreliable feedback channel. In other words, the coherent time of the main channel is sufficiently great for TAS phase. The construction of wiretap code at Alice is similar to Section III. We denote P e as the probability of a single-bit feedback error. Without any loss of generality, the number of transmit antennas is assumed to be equal to the power of two (i.e., N t = 2 B ), the feedback bit-errors are independent, and then the probability of feedback error, i.e., Alice erroneously selects any non-optimal transmit antenna for transmission, is determined by ε = 1 − (1 − P e ) B . Thus, with probability of 1 − ε, Alice will select correctly the optimal transmit antenna. However, with probability of ε, the feedback from Bob to Alice will be incorrect and Alice will select a transmit antenna with its SNR not being the maximum at Bob. In the erroneous feedback case any non-maximum SNRs will be used with the equal probability 1/(N t − 1). Using the order statistics [31] , the pdf of a random sample within those (N t − 1) SNRs, denoted by f c (γ m ), can be derived as
where p (γ m ) and P (γ m ) are given by (8) , and f (γ m ) is given by (7) . As a result, the pdf of the SNR for the main channel with erroneous feedback, denoted by f (e) (γ m ), is given as
where χ
A. Secrecy Outage Probability
Similar to the analysis in Section IV-B, the secrecy outage probability with erroneous feedback can also be expressed as a linear combination of the secrecy outage probability for the TAS-MRC scheme with perfect feedback and the secrecy outage probability for the MRC scheme, i.e., (33) , as shown at the bottom of this page, where ε out (N t ) is given by (17) , and ε out (1) is the special case of ε out (N t ) with N t = 1, which is obtained in (18) .
Remark 4: Note that the secrecy outage probability in (33) is an increasing function of χ because ε out (1) ≥ ε out (N t ) always holds, which means that as P e increases, the secrecy outage probability will increase. Furthermore, as P e → 1, χ will approach one and ε (e) out approaches ε out (1) . It indicates that the severe feedback errors will cause a secrecy diversity gain loss and only MRC diversity at Bob can be guaranteed. Also, as P e → 0 and χ → 0, the performance gain from TAS-MRC can be obtained, as expected.
B. The Probability of Non-Zero Secrecy Rate
It can be seen from (32) that f (e) (γ m ), the pdf of the SNR with erroneous feedback, is a linear combination of f (γ m ), the pdf of the TAS/MRC-based SNR with perfect feedback, and p (γ m ), the pdf of the MRC-based SNR. Thus, the probability of non-zero secrecy rate with erroneous feedback is found as
where P non (N t ) is given by (22) , and P non (1) is the special case of P non (N t ) with N t = 1, given by (23).
Remark 5: From (34), it can be found that the probability of non-zero secrecy rate is a decreasing function 3 When N t = 1, we denote χ = 0.
ε (e)
of χ since P non (N t ) is always not smaller than P non (1) . Furthermore, according to χ
, it is concluded that the probability of non-zero secrecy rate decreases with P e , or erroneous feedback degrades the secrecy performance.
C. Asymptotic Outage Probability
Now, we proceed to evaluate the asymptotic expressions for the secrecy outage probability for the cases P e = 0 and P e = 0, respectively.
• P e = 0: From (33) 
where the secrecy array gain 2 is given in (30).
• P e = 0: Since the first term in (33) can introduce the secrecy diversity order of N t N r as shown in the case of P e = 0, the secrecy diversity order is expected to be between N t N r and N r in the low to middle SNR regime. However, asγ m → ∞, the second term will be more dominating at high SNRs. Thus, the asymptotic secrecy outage probability can be written as
In addition, in order to more clearly characterize the change of the diversity order from low to middle SNRs, we can express the asymptotic secrecy outage probability as
m . Notably, we can conclude that the expected diversity order of N t N r cannot be realized with erroneous feedback, and only the diversity order of N r remains. In addition, it is mentioned that similar to Section III-C, the asymptotic allocation of a fixed number of antennas N total between Alice and Bob can also be established for P e = 0 and P e = 0, respectively.
V. PERFORMANCE WITH BOTH TIME-DELAYED AND ERRONEOUS FEEDBACK
In this section, we analyze the secrecy performance of the TAS-MRC scheme when both feedback delays and errors are present. With probability of 1 − ε, the feedback of the optimal antenna index is decoded correctly. However, the feedback is also delayed by τ , and therefore Alice selects the transmit antenna corresponding to the delayed version of the maximum SNR. On the other hand, with probability of ε, the feedback Alice receives is decoded erroneously. Using the induced order statistics [31] , the pdf of the delayed version of the non-maximum SNR, denoted by f c (γ m ), can be expressed as [16] 
where p (γ m ) corresponds to the special case of f (γ m ) with N t = 1, and f c (γ m ) is given by (31) . As such, the pdf of the SNR for the main channel with consideration of feedback errors and delays, denoted by f (e) (γ m ), is given as
where χ is defined in (32) . We can observe that
is given by (8) , which is expected since if no TAS is employed, i.e., N t = 1, the feedback delay will not affect the pdf of the SNR for the TAS-based scheme.
A. Secrecy Outage Probability
The secrecy outage probability with both outdated and erroneous feedback can also be expressed as a linear combination of the secrecy outage probability for the TAS/MRC-based scheme with outdated feedback and the secrecy outage probability for the MRC-based scheme, i.e., (41), as shown at the bottom of this page, whereε out (N t ) is given by (16) andε out (1) is the special case ofε out (N t ) with N t = 1 and ε out (1) = ε out (1).
Remark 6: As in Remark 1, in the case of ρ = 0, the secrecy outage probability for the TAS/MRC-based scheme with time-delayed feedback is the same as that of N t = 1, i.e.,ε out (N t ) =ε out (1) = ε out (1) . Similarly, (41) reduces tõ ε (e) out = ε out (1), and therefore the secrecy outage probability will also be independent of P e when ρ = 0. As expected, as P e → 1,ε (e) out will approach ε out (1) , which means that the TAS/MRC-based scheme degenerates to the MRC-based scheme and only the MRC diversity gain can be obtained.
B. The Probability of Non-Zero Secrecy Rate
From (40), we also observe that f (e) (γ m ), the pdf of the SNR with both time-delayed and erroneous feedback, can be expressed as a linear combination of f (γ m ), the pdf of the SNR for the TAS/MRC-based scheme with timedelayed feedback, and p (γ m ), the pdf of the MRC-based SNR. Similar to the analysis presented in Section IV-B, the probability of non-zero secrecy rate with outdated and erroneous feedback can be expressed as a linear combination of the probability of non-zero secrecy rate for the TAS/MRC-based scheme with outdated feedback and the probability of non-zero secrecy rate for the MRC-based scheme. That is,P
ε (e)
whereP non (N t ) is given by (21) . Likewise,P non (1) is the special case ofP non (N t ) with N t = 1 and given by (23) . Remark 7: As in Remark 3, when ρ = 0, the probability of non-zero secrecy rate for the TAS/MRC-based scheme with time-delayed feedback is the same as that of N t = 1, i.e.,P non (N t ) =P non (1) = P non (1). Thus, (42) reduces tõ P (e) non = P non (1), meaning that when ρ = 0, the probability of non-zero secrecy rate will be independent of P e .
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Secrecy Performance
In this section, we present numerical results to examine the effect of imperfect feedback on secrecy performance. In all the figures, the solid and dash lines represent numerical results using the closed-form expressions derived and the marks show the simulation results. As we can see, our analytical results all match perfectly with the simulations.
In Fig. 2 , results are provided for the secrecy outage probability using (16) and the asymptotic outage probability versusγ m . As can be seen, the asymptotic curves are very tight with the analytical ones at high SNRs and feedback delays have a significant impact on the secrecy outage probability. Results show that the loss of the secrecy outage performance due to feedback delays is especially obvious at highγ m , which causes the secrecy diversity loss. It is illustrated that when ρ = 1, asγ m → ∞, the gain from TAS will eliminate and only the MRC diversity gain remains. Fig. 3 shows the probability of non-zero secrecy rate in (21) versusγ m . Results illustrate that for a fixedγ w , Pr {R s > 0} increases withγ m and asγ m → ∞, Pr {R s > 0} will approach one even when feedback experiences a time-delay. Moreover, Pr {R s > 0} will decrease with an increase in the number of the eavesdropper's antennas N e . It is obvious that delayed feedback has detrimental effects on the secrecy performance, the larger the delay (i.e. smaller value of ρ), the smaller the probability of non-zero secrecy rate. We also observe that as ρ increases, the secrecy performance can be enhanced. As shown in (23), a non-zero secrecy rate would exist even when the current channel is fully independent of the channel associated with the selected index, i.e., ρ = 0.
Figs. 4 and 5 study the effect of erroneous feedback on the secrecy performance using the analytical results (33) and (34), respectively. In the simulations, we assume that the feedback bits undergo a binary symmetric channel with error probability P e , which introduces a bit error with probability P e and treats each bit independently. As shown in Fig. 5 , the probability of non-zero secrecy rate reduces as P e increases. Although there exists erroneous feedback, Pr {R s > 0} will approach one asγ m → ∞. The secrecy outage probability and the asymptotic outage probability versusγ m are shown in Fig. 4 for various P e . It can be seen that the erroneous feedback has a significant effect on the secrecy outage diversity, especially in highγ m . When P e = 0, the diversity gain from TAS disappears and the receiver only obtains the MRC diversity gain. Also, the secrecy array gain 4 shows that the secrecy diversity order changes from N t N r to N r . It can be seen that asγ m → ∞, the second term in (33) is more dominating in the high SNR regime; thus 4 approaches 3 , as expected. Fig. 6 presents the secrecy outage probability results (41) when both time-delayed feedback and erroneous feedback are considered. We observe that when ρ = 0, i.e., random antenna selection, the secrecy outage probability is independent of P e . A similar result can also be observed in Fig. 7 , wherē γ w =γ m /10. This corresponds to the case where the power at the transmitter increases, andγ w increases withγ m . It can be seen that at very low SNR, the secrecy outage probability is close to one, which means that we cannot expect any secrecy. As expected, the time-delayed and erroneous feedback have significant effects on the secrecy outage performance. Fig. 8 characterizes the effects of α = N t /N total on the secrecy outage probability with N total = 10. When ρ = 1 or P e = 0, more antennas should be allocated to Bob, i.e., the best allocation to minimize the secrecy outage probability is α = 0.1 (N t = 1). However, when ρ = 1 and P e = 0, the best α is between 0.3 and 0.4. As analyzed in Section III-C, we can adopt the function 1/(N r !) N t to replace the secrecy outage probability. The value of 1/(N r !) N t is also drawn in this figure. It can be found that the trends of the secrecy outage probability and the approximate function 1/(N r !) N t versus α match each other reasonably well.
B. Comparison With Other Schemes
For the typical passive eavesdropping scenario (in which the transmitter does not know the eavesdropper's channel), the masked beamforming method proposed in [9] and the codebook-based beamforming (CB) method proposed in [12] are two effective schemes to enhance secure communications. In this subsection, we compare the TAS-MRC with these schemes. For the sake of a fair comparison, we consider N r = 1, i.e., MISO wiretap channels. The transmitted signal for the masked beamforming is given as [9] where s is the data symbol with E{|s| 2 } = 1, t represents the normalized beamforming vector with t = 1, and z is the AN vector with R z = E{zz † } and trace{R z } = 1. Also, λ denotes the transmit power allocation parameter between data and AN, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, and P is the total transmit power. According to [9] and [10] , the transmitter should choose the beamforming vector t as the principal eigenvector t 1 which corresponds to the largest eigenvalue of hh † , and the AN vector z can be expressed as a linear combination of the remaining N t −1 eigenvectors, i.e, z lies in the nullspace of h † . In addition, when λ = 1, masked beamforming reduces to the naive beamforming (NB) scheme, i.e., no AN is used.
For CB, the received signals at legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper can be expressed, respectively, as [12] 
where q = arg max c i ∈C |h † c i | is the selected codeword, and C = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c N } is a pre-designed codebook of N unit norm vectors, which is known to all parties (including the eavesdropper). Thus, the corresponding index of q should be fed back to the transmitter. We apply two different codebooks for comparison. For N = 4, we will design a codebook using the Generalized Lloyd Algorithm (GLA) (also known as LBG algorithm) presented in [32] and [33] , where the minimum distance between different codes w i and w j is δ = 1 − |w † i w j | 2 = 0.9999. For N = 16, we will use a Grassmannian codebook proposed in [34] . Thus, the feedback of 2 and 4 bits is necessary for the codebook sizes N = 4 and N = 16, respectively. Fig. 9 compares the secrecy outage probability of the TAS-MRC scheme to other schemes, assumingγ m = 15 dB andγ w = 0 dB. As we can see, when the normalized delay f d τ is very small, the performance of 'MB' (masked beamforming) is much better than the others. However, when the channel is severely outdated, i.e., f d τ is large, the performance of 'MB' significantly degrades because of noise leakage caused by imperfect CSI for the main channel. In addition, as f d τ decreases, the performance of 'MB, λ = 0.9' is much better than 'MB, λ = 0.5' while 'MB, λ = 0.5' performs better when f d τ is large. From the above simulation, we can obtain the following facts about 'MB': 1) If the main channel is perfectly known at the transmitter, AN can be made invisible to the legitimate receiver but only degrading the eavesdropper's reception. However, the imprecise knowledge of the main channel will cause noise leakage, thus significantly degrading the secrecy performance.
2) The performance of 'MB' largely depends on how well the power is allocated between the signal and the AN. As f d τ decreases (ρ → 1), we should use more power to transmit the AN. However, most power should be used to transmit the signal if the CSI of the main channel is severely outdated.
From the figure we can also see that the 'CB, N = 16' and 'NB' schemes outperform TAS-MRC. However, in the 'NB' scheme, Bob should transmit the complete CSI to Alice, requiring in theory an unlimited amount of feedback, while in the 'CB, N = 16' scheme, the amount of feedback information is B = log N = 4 bits. The proposed TAS-MRC scheme only requires a B = log N t = 2-bit feedback. In addition, the simulation results of the unmodified TAS/MRC scheme where Bob feeds back the outdated SNR together with the index of the "strongest" transmit antenna are also given in this figure. In this scheme, Alice would use the outdated SNR to determine R m for wiretap code construction and there will be an additional outage when Alice transmits but Bob cannot decode the message, i.e.,γ m < γ m . Sinceγ m and γ m are two correlated χ 2 -distributed random variables, the probability of the outage eventγ m < γ m would be equal to 0.5, which results in ε out ≥ 0.5. Fig. 10 compares the secrecy outage probability of the TAS-MRC scheme to the 'CB, N = 4' and 'CB, N = 16' schemes in presence of erroneous feedback. As shown, with perfect feedback, i.e., P e = 0, the secrecy performance of the 'CB, N = 16' scheme is better than that of the TAS-MRC scheme. However, the 'CB, N = 16' scheme requires higher feedback load, i.e., B = 4 bits, thus causing higher feedback error than that of the TAS-MRC scheme according to ε = 1 − (1 − P e ) B . It can be found that when P e = 0.01, there exists a crossover point ofγ m . Above this point, the TAS-MRC scheme outperforms the 'CB, N = 16', which enhances the robustness to the feedback errors. In addition, from Figs. 9 and 10, we can find that the 'CB, N = 4' obtains the same secrecy performance as that of the TAS-MRC scheme. Although the feedback requirement is also B = 2 bits for the 'CB, N = 4' scheme, the TAS-MRC only requires a single RF chain, which effectively reduces the system's complexity. The overall comparison of these schemes in different scenarios is summarized in Table I , where N t = 4, N r = 1, N e = 2, R 0 = 1 bits/s/Hz, andγ w = 0 dB.
Finally, as indicated in [35] , antenna selection is the simplest form of linear precoding/beamforming. The TAS-MRC scheme is limited in terms of its benefits to the overall capacity as it reduces the number of RF chains and does not allow for the full array gain. However, we can see that the TAS-MRC scheme offers a good trade-off between complexity and performance compared with 'NB', 'MB', and 'CB' schemes. In addition, this paper mainly focuses on a single stream transmission and antenna subset selection with multiple data streams is also a worthy subject of future research [13] .
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper studied the effect of imperfect feedback on the secrecy performance of MIMO wiretap channels with TAS at the transmitter and MRC at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. Time-delayed feedback and erroneous feedback were separately and jointly considered. We derived exact closed-form expressions for the probability of non-zero secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability. Our model provides useful insight into the secrecy performance in practical environments when time-delayed and/or erroneous feedback are present. Our analysis is general and encompasses the existing results as special cases. Specially, our asymptotic expressions revealed that imperfect feedback significantly degrades the secrecy performance and when the feedback is outdated and/or erroneous, the expected secrecy diversity order of N t N r cannot be realized at high SNRs for the main channel. The secrecy diversity order is not affected by N e . Prof. Ma is a member of the Executive Directors of Hunan Electronic Institute.
